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What Happens in Delaware Need Not Stay in 
Delaware: How Trulia Can Strengthen Private 
Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws 
Class-action lawsuits have been used by private plaintiffs to enforce 
the federal securities laws since those laws were enacted in the 1930s. With 
the SEC retaining concurrent authority to enforce federal securities laws, 
a debate has emerged as to whether the private right of action helps or 
hinders public enforcement. The primary criticism of private securities 
litigation is that rent-seeking attorneys abuse the system by bringing 
frivolous litigation aimed at achieving a settlement and a fee. In the 
public merger context, the potentially disastrous consequences of failing 
to close an announced deal on time make corporations eager to settle 
potentially troublesome litigation. The government responded to the 
overabundance of securities lawsuits in the 1990s by tightening the reigns 
on class-action securities litigation, making what was once low-hanging 
fruit for plaintiffs’ attorneys more difficult to grasp. At the same time, 
there was a marked uptick in the number of class-action corporate 
lawsuits brought in state courts, in particular, in Delaware. These suits 
claim breach of fiduciary duty on the grounds that securities filings 
accompanying public merger announcements provided shareholders with 
insufficient or inadequate information. 
This Comment claims that the wave of merger objection class-action 
suits arising in the mid-2000s should be properly viewed as federal 
securities law claims masquerading as corporate law claims, thus 
avoiding the heightened securities class-action requirements of the 1990s. 
In a recent case from the Delaware Court of Chancery, In re Trulia, Inc. 
Shareholder Litigation, Chancellor Bouchard established a new “plainly 
material” standard for approving class-action settlements where 
deficient federal securities filings are at issue. Because Trulia is properly 
viewed as a state court’s response to deficient enforcement of the federal 
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securities laws, it has the potential to serve as a bellwether for the state of 
health of private enforcement of the federal securities laws.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a long-running debate in the context of the federal 
securities laws between the relative merits of public enforcement by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), and private 
enforcement, primarily in federal court, with claims brought by private 
plaintiffs.1 Though advocates from both sides of the debate tout the 
benefits of one approach over the other, there is general agreement 
that private enforcement provides a necessary complement to the 
 
 1. See generally Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the 
Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1994). 
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SEC’s efforts.2 However, the checkered history of private enforcement 
under the federal securities laws unavoidably elicits criticism that this 
system is compromised. Abusive overenforcement, caused by 
opportunistic plaintiffs’ lawyers bringing meritless claims and seeking 
settlement and fee awards, have done serious damage to the 
reputation, and arguably even the ability, of private plaintiffs to 
efficiently enforce the federal securities laws through private causes of 
action in federal court.3 Undoubtedly, private litigation plays an 
essential role, but excessive abusive litigation calls into question the 
efficacy of the private enforcement system. 
What prior analyses discussing the effectiveness of private 
enforcement of the federal securities laws have failed to consider, and 
what this comment intends to add to this conversation, is that 
conditions on the ground have shifted dramatically since the mid-
1990s and the face of securities class-action lawsuits has changed. 
Commentators remain focused on whether private enforcement is 
working in the context of securities litigation, without considering 
that, beginning in 1995, much of the abusive private litigation 
surrounding public company mergers traditionally brought as federal 
securities claims, has been brought instead as state corporate law 
claims, particularly in Delaware.4 
Because of this shift in private securities law enforcement from the 
federal securities laws to state corporate law, assessing the health of 
private securities enforcement is incomplete without also considering 
the success of private enforcement in the areas of state corporate law 
that have swallowed much federal securities litigation. With this new 
perspective, a recent corporate law decision in the Delaware Court of 
 
 2. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 874 (9th ed. 2014) (“A 
mixed system . . . exploits complementarities between agencies and courts.”); Howell E. Jackson 
& Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 
J. FIN. ECON. 207, 237 (2009) (“The relative value of public and private enforcement is a key 
issue for understanding . . . financial markets . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 3. Jackson & Roe, supra note 2, at 208. 
 4. See infra Section III.A. 
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Chancery, In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation,5 has altered the 
landscape of litigation involving public company mergers. 
The Trulia holding applies a “plainly material”6 standard when 
assessing the value of additional disclosures offered to shareholders to 
settle claims that prior merger-related disclosures were inadequate.7 
This is a significant blow to public merger litigation,8 which, in a real 
sense, is the offspring of securities fraud class-action litigation.9 Where 
a defendant could formerly settle such claims by providing an omitted 
piece of information, even if redundant or trivial, now, the Court of 
Chancery has said that it will not approve such settlements unless the 
additional information offered is actually of “plainly material” value to 
shareholders. This should ultimately serve to suppress the plaintiffs’ 
bar’s appetite for bringing strike suits (meritless class-action lawsuits 
that force settlement by threatening delays)10 by reducing defendants’ 
ability to get to a quick settlement and fee award. With this new 
precedent established, the Court of Chancery has greatly reduced the 
availability of dry kindling fueling overenforcement in this area of the 
law. In this respect, Chancellor Bouchard has shown a willingness to 
take a stand against meritless securities litigation, where previously 
such efforts required multiple acts of Congress.11 Consequently, 
jurisdictions outside of Delaware have already begun to adopt the 
Court of Chancery’s approach in public merger litigation.12 Judges 
hearing class-action claims built around securities disclosures, whether 
arising as fiduciary duty claims under state corporate law or directly 
under the federal securities laws, should not shy away from applying 
Trulia. Doing so would reduce abusive litigation and breathe needed 
 
 5. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 6. Id. at 898. 
 7. Id. at 907. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See infra Section III.A. 
 10. See Browning Jeffries, The Plaintiffs’ Lawyer’s Transaction Tax: The New Cost of Doing 
Business in Public Company Deals, 11 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 56 (2014) (stating that strike suits 
are the primary form of abuse in shareholder litigation). 
 11. See infra Section III.A. 
 12. See In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2016) (applying 
Trulia in approving disclosure-only settlement); Raul v. Burke, No. 15 CVS 16703, 2016 WL 
382833, at *1 n.2 (Super. Ct. N.C. Jan. 28, 2016) (applying the analysis Chancellor Bouchard 
developed in Trulia). 
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life back into the credibility of private enforcement of the federal 
securities laws. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL 
SECURITIES LAWS 
A. Public Enforcement and the Private Right of Action 
Federal securities laws first came about in response to the stock 
market crash of 1929, which ushered in the Great Depression.13 
Congress responded with two key pieces of legislation: The Securities 
Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”), and The Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).14 In enacting these laws, Congress 
created a regime focused primarily on disclosure. Federal securities 
laws are built around detailed and extensive reporting requirements 
that aim to protect investors by requiring the full and accurate 
disclosure of all relevant information relating to securities offerings. In 
the case of public companies, this includes disclosing periodic financial 
statements, insider transactions, merger details, and so forth.15 By 
committing to the federal securities laws questions of what must be 
disclosed, Congress left to the states the task of addressing the fairness 
of the underlying corporate actions and transactions driving the 
securities filings.16 In practice, the SEC oversees the disclosure of 
corporate action, while states analyze corporate action through the 
framework of fiduciary duties found in corporate law. 
Congress created the SEC with the mandate to administer the 
federal securities laws but did not give it an enforcement monopoly. 
Congress also created an explicit private right of action for many 
 
 13. See Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation 
in the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495, 495 (2003); What We Do, U.S. SEC. 
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified June 
10, 2013) (explaining that prior to the creation of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, 
federal regulation of the securities market was effectively nonexistent, especially and perhaps 
most pointedly during the post-World War I boom in securities sales and offerings). 
 14. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 2–4 (Kris Markarian ed., 3d 
ed. 2011). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Karmel, supra note 13, at 498–99 (when dealing with public offerings, federal laws 
adopt “full disclosure philosophy,” while state law is merit based, focusing on whether capital 
structures are “fair, just and equitable”). 
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aspects of the federal securities laws, and for others, Congress implied 
a private right of action allowing private plaintiffs to police offenders 
through litigation.17 
Those who criticize the federal courts’ handling of private actions 
under federal securities law tend to focus on class-action lawsuits. They 
particularly criticize the notorious 10b-5 fraud suit, alleging that this 
judicially implied cause of action leads to frivolous suits and 
heightened agency costs. However, this focus is too narrow. Over the 
last decade, trends in private enforcement actions brought against 
public companies on securities-related grounds have morphed, at least 
on their face, from primarily federal securities law claims to state 
corporate law claims. 
Under the federal securities laws, public corporations—those who 
have registered securities with the SEC—are subject to various filing 
requirements, disclosure requirements, and liability. Under state 
corporate law, state courts decide questions of fiduciary duty, 
including those related to securities disclosure. For this reason, many 
actions litigated against public corporations have both federal and 
state law implications.18 A clear example of this emerges in the context 
of public mergers and acquisitions. Consider the following: a merger 
may include a tender offer.19 If so, provisions of the tender offer are 
governed by the Exchange Act and must meet various reporting 
requirements administered by the SEC.20 Questions over the merits of 
the merger, such as whether the consideration provided was fair or 
whether the transaction was in the best interest of the shareholders, 
 
 17. Id.; Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State 
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1998) (Securities Act created 
express remedies; Exchange Act implied remedies); see also Note, Private Causes of Action for 
Option Investors Under SEC Rule 10b-5: A Policy, Doctrinal, and Economic Analysis, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 1959, 1961 (1987) (noting universal acceptance of an implied right of action under 
Rule 10b-5). 
 18. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 924 (Del. Ch. 2003) (Strine, 
V.C.) (commenting that both an ongoing federal securities class-action lawsuit and a state 
corporate law derivative action for breach of fiduciary duty came from “substantively 
identical” facts). 
 19. A tender offer occurs when a potential buyer makes a public offer to acquire shares 
from each stockholder at a certain per share price. 
 20. What Regulates M&A?, section 1.1 to Mergers & Acquisitions 2017, INT’L COMP. 
LEGAL GUIDES (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/mergers-and-
acquisitions/mergers-and-acquisitions-2017/usa. 
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fall under state corporate law.21 Moreover, in an acquisition, the 
corporate law of the state of incorporation of the target company 
governs whether directors disclosed adequate information to enable 
shareholders to make an informed decision to vote in favor of a 
merger.22 However, where votes for approval of a merger are solicited 
by proxy, federal law again steps in and the terms of the Exchange Act 
govern the proxy solicitation.23 These examples illustrate that public 
corporate activity “falls within the dual jurisdiction of the federal 
government and the individual state in which the . . . company 
is incorporated.”24 
The overlap between securities and corporate law has facilitated a 
relatively recent shift in private litigation surrounding public merger 
activity. Abusive class-action securities litigation brought by 
enterprising plaintiffs’ attorneys forced Congress to pass legislation 
making class-action securities litigation more difficult and costlier to 
bring, which makes meritless claims less appealing.25 However, 
because the federal securities laws compel disclosure in advance of 
mergers by public companies in many instances, Congress’s efforts 
had an unintended effect. Securities disclosures provide information 
about recent merger activity that enables plaintiffs’ lawyers to quickly 
sue under state corporate law, claiming, among other things, that the 
directors breached their fiduciary duties by disclosing inadequate 
information. Because state corporate laws do not typically prohibit 
quick and easy class-action lawsuits, as do the federal securities laws, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers are able to bring class-action suits under state 
corporate law that are substantially like the claims brought as federal 
securities claims, namely faulty securities disclosures. To illustrate this 
point, consider a company that has entered into a merger agreement 
and must disclose this fact in its public filings with the SEC.26 This 
revelation allows plaintiffs’ lawyers the chance to bring a lawsuit 
against the disclosing company relating to the quality of the 
 
 21. See Karmel, supra note 13. 
 22. What Regulates M&A, supra note 20. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 26. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Form 8-K, Section 1, Item 1.01. 
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disclosures. The timing of the disclosure prescribed by the federal 
securities laws allows plaintiffs to sue the company before the merger 
closes. This gives the plaintiffs’ lawyers considerable leverage in 
negotiating a settlement with the defendant who is eager to avoid 
delay in the now public merger process.27 Because legislation in the 
1990s rendered federal securities class-action lawsuits more 
cumbersome, plaintiffs’ lawyers shifted their preferred causes of action 
from those of faulty disclosures under the Securities Act and fraud 
under the Exchange Act to breaches of fiduciary duty under state 
corporate law. The new approach simply uses the same information in 
the same securities filings previously used to bring claims under federal 
securities laws to bring nearly identical claims under state corporate 
law. In hindsight, this seems like a natural shift. These claims are, at 
their heart, still securities claims (they originate from, and are often 
focused primarily on, federal securities disclosures). For this reason, 
judicial action at the state level to curb these claims is pertinent to, 
and indicative of, the health and efficiency of private enforcement of 
the federal securities laws. 
B. The Case for Private Enforcement 
Proponents of private enforcement of the federal securities laws 
tout the instrumental role that it plays in deterring fraudulent 
corporate behavior.28 The general premise is that as private enforcers 
bring claims against corporate defendants, the likelihood of 
punishment increases, and this has a deterrent effect on bad behavior.29 
Some argue that legislative restrictions to the private right of action in 
securities laws are the culprit for the accounting scandals of the early 
2000s and the economic collapse of 2008.30 Private parties should be 
unfettered in their ability to help deter federal securities violations 
 
 27. Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 
533, 535 (1997) (observing that corporate defendants often settle meritless claims because of 
the “enormous financial burden of litigation”). 
 28. Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and 
Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 671 (2014). 
 29. Keith L. Johnson, Deterrence of Corporate Fraud Through Securities Litigation: The 
Role of Institutional Investors, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 162 (1997). 
 30. Ramirez, supra note 28, at 671–73. 
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through private action and market forces will limit abusive litigation.31 
While this argument represents a polar extreme of the conversation, it 
relies in large part on the well-accepted premise that private 
enforcement is a necessary, well-equipped mechanism for enforcing 
the laws built to keep investors safe.32 
It is widely recognized that the SEC is not equipped to carry out 
its mandate without essential help from private enforcers.33 One reason 
for this is that the SEC does not have the resources to enforce the 
federal securities laws without additional help.34 Another is that the 
SEC’s incentives do not always align with those of private enforcers 
and investors,35 and private enforcement is necessary to protect the 
latter group’s interests. Yet another is that the SEC is hampered from 
its mission by political and partisan pressures in a way that private 
parties are not.36 However, the system of private enforcement that has 
grown up with the securities laws has proven susceptible to abuse. The 
new standard introduced in Trulia has the potential to suppress a 
sizeable source of this abuse and breath added credibility into private 
litigation as an effective enforcement mechanism. 
One prevalent criticism of private enforcement in the securities law 
context is that abusive litigation grew so problematic that Congress 
had to enact the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) to 
 
 31. See id. 
 32. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). 
 33. See id.; S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 37–38 (1995) (Senators Sarbanes, Bryan, and Boxer 
repeatedly acknowledging importance of private enforcement mechanism); Brief of AARP & 
North American Securities Administrators Ass’n, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 
at 6, Janus Capital Grp. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011) (No. 09-525) (citing 
William R. McLucas, former director of the Enforcement Division of the SEC, who said the 
private right of action under Rule 10b-5 is a necessary supplement). 
 34. Brief of AARP & North American Securities Administrators Ass’n, Inc. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 33, at 6. 
 35. Id. at 12; see also Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, The End of the Financial World as 
We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/
opinion/04lewiseinhorn.html. 
 36.  Mark Schoeff Jr., How Partisan Politics Have Poisoned the SEC, INVESTMENTNEWS 
(May 10, 2015, 12:01 am), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150510/REG
/150509926/how-partisan-politics-have-poisoned-the-sec (quoting New Jersey Representative 
and House Financial Services Committee member Scott Garrett as saying “[u]nfortunately, it 
appears that the SEC is becoming more political and more distracted from its core mission 
than  ever”). 
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reign it in.37 This Comment argues that Chancellor Bouchard’s recent 
refusal to approve disclosure-only settlements in Trulia, Inc. 
Stockholder Litigation38 has the potential to make significant progress 
in stemming the tide of abusive private enforcement of state corporate 
law claims against public companies that are, at heart, federal securities 
claims. In that sense, Chancellor Bouchard’s insistence on a higher 
standard and rejection of disclosure-only settlements can be seen as a 
continuation of Congress’s intention behind the PSLRA. Because of 
the clear nexus between the Trulia decision and federal securities laws, 
state and federal judges hearing disclosure-focused corporate claims 
and federal securities claims should be willing to look to Trulia for 
guidance. In so doing, Trulia can help repair the reputation of private 
enforcement of the federal securities laws damaged by decades 
of abuse. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF OVERENFORCEMENT 
A. Class-Action Lawsuits: From Federal Securities Law, to State 
Corporate Law 
Since the mid-1990s, Congress has been pushing to quell a 
growing tide of securities class-action litigation, yet the unintended 
effect has been to push litigants39 from federal securities law claims to 
state corporate law merger objection claims.40 As fraud-on-the-market 
litigation under Rule 10b-5 grew particularly troublesome and 
expansive,41 Congress stepped in with a legislative fix. The solution 
 
 37. Michael B. Dunn, Note, Pleading Scienter After the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act: Or, a Textualist Revenge, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 193, 194–95 (1998). 
 38. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 907 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 39.  While litigation of this type has indeed shifted to state courts under corporate law 
causes of action, this does not necessarily reflect a shift in preference on behalf of litigants. This 
migration is most likely a calculated strategy of the plaintiff’s bar, not its clients. In fact, Congress 
described the PSLRA as an “attack on lawyer-driven litigation,” which Newt Gingrich 
characterized as “inherently abusive.” Fisch, supra note 27, at 533–35. 
 40. See supra Section II.A. 
 41. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975). One 
commentator described this process as follows:  
Some lawyers went further in an effort to generate legal fees by developing securities 
fraud litigation. Witnesses before Congress testified to lawyers maintaining stables of 
named plaintiffs who were available for use as class representatives . . . . These 
plaintiffs received bonus payments for their participation but had little actual role in 
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was twofold: raise the bar for prevailing on securities class-action 
claims in federal court,42 and funnel more securities litigation away 
from state courts into the federal system.43 In 1995, Congress passed 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)44 in response to 
“perceived abuses of the class-action vehicle in litigation involving 
nationally traded securities.”45 The PSLRA applied to all class-action 
securities cases brought in federal court46 and operated by 
implementing “procedural protections”47 that made it more difficult 
to prevail on those claims.48 Congress’s stated intent in enacting the 
PSLRA was to prevent private securities litigation from being 
“undermined by those who seek to line their own pockets by bringing 
abusive and meritless suits.”49 The market reacted by electing to bring 
these securities claims in state court instead,50 so Congress followed 
up the PSLRA with the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
of 1998 (SLUSA).51 SLUSA ensured that securities class-action suits 
could no longer be brought under state securities laws, only federal 
law,52 and that federal securities class-action suits in state court could 
be removed to federal court.53 In 2005, Congress followed up the 
SLUSA with the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).54 Unlike the 
 
the subsequent cases and were often ignorant of the nature of the claims to which 
they lent their names.  
Fisch, supra note 27, at 536. 
 42. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4 (2012); HAZEN, supra note 14, at 62. 
 43. See generally Painter, supra note 17. 
 44. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  
 45. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006). 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 77z–1(a)(1) (2012). 
 47. Jay B. Kasner et al., Merrill Lynch v. Dabit: The Supreme Court Forecloses State Law 
“Holders” Claims, INSIGHTS, May 2006, at 1, 1 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (1995) 
(Conf. Rep.)). 
 48. See Marvin L. Frank, Staying Derivative Actions Pursuant to PSLRA and SLUSA, 
N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 21, 2005), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/900005439409. 
 49.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
 50. Kasner et al., supra note 47, at 2. 
 51. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 
112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 52. See Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 74 (2006). 
 53. Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Putting Stockholders First, Not the First-Filed Complaint, 69 
BUS. LAW. 1, 9–10 (2013). 
 54. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
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PSLRA and the SLUSA which applied only to securities class-action 
suits, CAFA applied to all class-action suits, allowing defendants to 
remove the claims from state court (which lawmakers felt were too 
plaintiff friendly)55 to federal court.56 
Congress’s intention with these three pieces of legislation was to 
concentrate securities class-action suits in the federal courts, where 
expertise in handling these matters could develop and abusive 
litigation could be reined in.57 If the measure of success for Congress’s 
efforts is the overall reduction of abusive securities litigation, then, 
objectively, Congress had some initial success.58 However, viewed 
through a broader lens, the legislation had an unintended, unforeseen, 
and somewhat opposite effect: plaintiffs’ lawyers were turned off by 
the increased resources required to successfully bring class-action 
securities claims in federal court and balked at the prospect of 
securities litigation in state court being removed to federal court.59 
Litigants instead began pursuing claims under state corporate law. 
While the CAFA generally allows all class-action litigation to be 
removed to federal court, it contains two exemptions that contributed 
to the preference for state corporate law claims. The first exemption, 
 
 55. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4 (2005) (“[S]tate court[] . . . judges have reputations for 
readily certifying classes and approving settlements without regard to class member interests.”). 
 56.  28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (2012) (“In General - A class action may be removed to 
a district court of the United States . . . .”). 
 57. See Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An 
Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 602 (2015) (arguing that 
merger disclosure claims be relegated away from state courts to federal courts, which are more 
specialized in applying the securities laws, and be maintained as claims under federal securities 
laws, which are more highly developed than state corporate law); Jeffries, supra note 10, at 65–
66 (stating that the PSLRA and the SLUSA were tailored for the peculiarities of the securities 
litigation market and were designed to channel more litigation to federal fora); see also Kasner et 
al., supra note 47, at 2 (noting the specialized nature of the PSLRA and SLUSA in combatting 
abuse of securities litigation). 
 58. See Stephen Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act 6–7 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 69, 
2007) (noting that securities litigation dipped after the PSLRA passed, but levels have since 
recovered, though dismissal is now more likely); Amanda M. Rose, Better Bounty Hunting: How 
the SEC’s New Whistleblower Program Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1235, 1236 (2014) (PSLRA dealt a “major blow” to fraud-on-the-market securities 
class actions). But see SVETLANA STARYKH & STEFAN BOETTRICH, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, 
RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2015 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 2 
(2016) (confirming rising trend in post-PSLRA securities litigation). 
 59. Strine et al., supra note 53, at 9–10. 
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found in sections 1453(d)(1) and (3), provides relief from the removal 
provision for claims concerning securities.60 On its face, this exemption 
appears to preserve a securities class-action plaintiff ’s ability to 
maintain its claim in state court. In application, however, the 
confusing intersection of the CAFA’s removal-enabling provisions, 
this carveout for securities claims, an explicit non-removal provision 
in the Securities Act, and the pro-federal jurisdiction provisions of the 
PSLRA and the SLUSA cast some doubt on whether securities class 
actions could be removed under CAFA.61 As courts took up the issue, 
no clear consensus emerged, leaving plaintiffs uncertain of what to 
expect if they initiated securities class action in state court.62 In 
contrast, the other class-action removal exemption in the CAFA was 
unambiguous. Section 1453(d)(2) exempted claims dealing with 
“internal affairs or governance . . . aris[ing] under or by virtue of the 
laws of the State in which [a] corporation or business enterprise is 
incorporated or organized.”63 This language leaves little doubt that 
class-action corporate law claims are not removable to federal court 
under CAFA. This presented class-action plaintiffs hoping to avoid 
federal court with a choice: bring a securities claim and face the 
possibility of removal to federal court under CAFA, or bring a state 
corporate law claim and enjoy relative certainty of non-removal. For 
many litigants, the choice for corporate law claims was clear. 
The reaction of the plaintiffs’ bar to Congress’s legislative 
attempts throughout the 1990s and 2000s to federalize securities 
class-action lawsuits throws an important point into sharp relief: 
almost any given corporate action by a public company that might 
injure shareholders’ rights can potentially be addressed under either 
the federal securities laws or state corporate law. High-dollar 
transactions by public companies are often targeted up front because 
 
 60.  28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(1), (3) (2012). 
 61.  See MAYER BROWN, EMERGING ISSUES IN SECURITIES LITIGATION: THE SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT’S RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF CAFA AND SLUSA FAVOR DEFENDANTS IN 
PURPORTED SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS (2009), https://www.mayerbrown.com/publications
/Emerging-Issues-in-Securities-Litigation-The-Seventh-Circuits-recent-interpretations-of-CAF
A-and-SLUSA-favor-defendants-in-purported-securities-class-actions-03-26-2009/ (describing 
a circuit split with courts grappling with the interplay of these various statutes, and no consistent 
interpretation emerging). 
 62.  See id. 
 63. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(2) (2012). 
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public disclosures provide detailed fodder that plaintiffs’ lawyers can 
act on quickly.64 Additionally, the corporate resources invested in the 
transaction make settlement a no-brainer for corporate managers 
eager to close their deal.65 In fact, from 2009 to 2014, the percentage 
of mergers valued over $100,000,000 that faced shareholder litigation 
exceeded 90%.66 In 2014, 75% of these lawsuits settled before the 
merger was consummated.67 It is clear from these figures that plaintiffs 
lawyers capitalize on the ease of bringing merger litigation and the 
willingness of defendants to settle. 
The contemporaneous shift away from federal securities class-
action lawsuits prompted by the PSLRA, SLUSA and CAFA, along 
with the entrance onto the scene and subsequent blossoming of 
merger litigation under state corporate law,68 should not be ignored 
or dismissed as coincidental. Merger objection litigation is, in this 
sense, a new face of the “abusive and meritless” securities litigation 
that Congress sought to quell by enacting the PSLRA.69 Actions in 
state courts to combat this problematic litigation are directly 
applicable in the context of the federal securities laws. 
The migration of the plaintiffs’ bar from actions under the federal 
securities laws to actions under state corporate law has raised the ire 
of many state court judges.70 In January 2016, Chancellor Bouchard 
of the Delaware Court of Chancery handed down a ruling in Trulia 
that represents a major milestone in the attempt to curtail merger 
 
 64.  K. Tyler O’Connell et al., Reducing the “Deal Tax”: Delaware’s Recent Scrutiny of 
Nonmonetary Settlements, BUS. L. TODAY, Oct. 2015, at 1, 1, https://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2015/10/deal-tax-201510.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 65.  Fisch, supra note 27, at 535–36 (noting that corporate defendants face “pressure . . . 
to settle even weak cases” stemming from the cost of defense and other institutional and deal-
based structures). 
 66.  CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING ACQUISITIONS 
OF PUBIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2015 AND 1H 2016 M&A LITIGATION 1 (2016) [hereinafter 
CORNERSTONE 2016]. 
 67.  Id. 
 68. RENZO COMOLLI ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2012 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 5 fig.3 (2013) (showing that 
merger objection litigation took off beginning in 2006). 
 69.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
 70. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016) 
(Bouchard, C.) (describing merger litigation that seeks additional disclosure and a settlement as 
the “historically trodden but suboptimal path”). 
4.Lewis.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  4:04 PM 
715 How Trulia Can Strengthen Private Enforcement 
 729 
objection litigation abuse.71 This case should be viewed as a 
continuation of Congress’s effort to remedy private litigation’s 
susceptibility to overenforcement in the securities context.72 
Moreover, it demonstrates a judicial willingness to stand up to 
frivolous securities-based litigation, a willingness which Congress 
found lacking in the lead up to the PSLRA.73 The Trulia decision has 
implications beyond state corporate law, and it should be considered 
and applied by state court judges outside of Delaware, as well as 
federal court judges when hearing litigation arising under, or 
implicating, the federal securities laws. 
B. The Magnitude of Merger-Objection Litigation and the Disclosure-
Only Settlement Epidemic 
Abusive class-action lawsuits are commonly referred to as “strike 
suits.”74 A strike suit, in the generic corporate sense, is a shareholder 
claim challenging certain elements of a securities filing or corporate 
action, whether proposed or consummated. The plaintiff knows that 
corporate mechanics will incentivize defendants to settle quickly, even 
if the claim has no underlying merit, in order to facilitate a securities 
offering, merger, large transaction, other deal timeline, or simply to 
avoid costly and potentially messy litigation.75 While strike suits crop 
up in all corners of corporate and securities laws, there is a particular 
form of strike suit unique to securities and public merger claims 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. See generally Jeffries, supra note 10, at 56 (noting that a response from both the 
federal legislature and state courts is the natural result of unbearably high agency costs in 
corporate litigation). 
 73.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (House and Senate Committees heard evidence of a 
variety of abusive practices committed in private securities litigation. The report notes that 
“[t]hese serious injuries to innocent parties are compounded by the reluctance of many judges 
to impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, except in those cases involving 
truly outrageous misconduct.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Broc Romanek, Disclosure-Only Settlements: In re Trulia As Death Knell?, 
DEAL LAWYERS (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.deallawyers.com/blog/2016/01/disclosure-
only-settlements-in-re-trulia-as-death-knell.html (labeling Trulia the latest in a long line of 
strike suits). 
 75. See Gregory A. Markel & Gillian Groarke Burns, Expert Q&A on Judicial Activism 
and Disclosure-Only Settlements in Delaware, PRAC. L.J., Aug.–Sept. 2006, at 22, 22–23. 
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known as a “disclosure-only settlement.”76 These suits challenge 
certain board actions relating to, and substantive elements of, a 
proposed merger. When the parties move to settle, the settlement 
proposal offers shareholders only additional disclosures and, of course, 
attorney’s fees for the plaintiffs’ lawyers.77  
Disclosure-only settlements are enabled because corporate and 
securities law provisions require certain disclosures for significant 
corporate transactions and securities offerings. Disclosure-only 
settlements are widespread.78 They occupy an area of law that 
implicates both state corporate and the federal securities laws,79 and 
they rose to prominence just as federal legislation made securities 
fraud class actions more difficult to bring. This nexus to the federal 
securities laws means that how judges deal with disclosure-only 
settlements is a strong proxy for the health of private enforcement of 
claims sounding in the federal securities laws. To the extent that state 
and federal courts apply Trulia’s “plainly material” standard, the 
potential for abusive securities-related litigation will diminish. 
Over the course of the last decade,80 disclosure-only settlements 
have become a familiar and burdensome presence in merger litigation, 
both within Delaware and without.81 The plaintiffs’ bar grew so 
aggressive that litigation was filed in nearly 90% of all announced 
mergers prior to 2016.82 Plaintiffs’ firms often bring suit days, and 
sometimes mere hours, after a proposed merger proposal is announced 
 
 76.  See Peter J. Walsh, Jr. & Aaron R. Sims, Trulia and the Demise of “Disclosure Only” 
Settlements in Delaware, BUS. L. TODAY, Feb. 2016, at 1, 1, https://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2016/02/delaware-insider-201602.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 77. See In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116 passim (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(Laster, V.C.) (characterizing the proposed settlement in Sauer-Danfoss as a “disclosure-only” 
settlement, and spending the entire opinion discussing the attributes of this type of settlement). 
 78. See supra Part III. 
 79. See supra Section II.A. 
 80. See supra Part III (noting that the burgeoning of merger objection litigation began 
in 2006 on the heels of the PSLRA, SLUSA, and CAFA). 
 81. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016) (holding 
that the disclosure-only settlement is the “historically trodden but suboptimal path”); William 
Foley et al., In re Riverbed: The Beginning of the End for Disclosure-Only Settlements in M&A 
Cases?, ORRICK (Sept. 29, 2015), http://blogs.orrick.com/securities-litigation/2015/09/29
/in-re-riverbed-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-disclosure-only-settlements-in-ma-cases/. 
 82.  CORNERSTONE 2016, supra note 66 (noting that merger litigation for announced 
deals over $100 million in value has dropped below 90% for first time since 2009, possibly 
because of the Trulia ruling); see also In re Sauer-Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1119. 
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to the public.83 The speed with which claims are filed allows plaintiff ’s 
lawyers virtually no time for thorough analysis of the merits of the 
transaction.84 Chancellor Bouchard has noted that it is highly unlikely, 
if not impossible, that nearly every proposed merger involves a breach 
of fiduciary duty, as plaintiffs claim.85 Instead, there is wide consensus 
that the claims are usually frivolous, and because corporate defendants 
settle in the vast majority of cases, these suits likely serve to support a 
cottage industry of “rentseeking” attorneys.86 The practice has grown 
so embedded and predictable that corporate managers, when 
structuring a merger, factor in a “deal-tax” to cover settlement and 
attorney’s fees that will need to be paid to settle the inevitable 
shareholder claims.87 This type of litigation, long familiar under federal 
 
 83.  See In re Sauer-Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1119 (lawsuit filed “hours after” announced 
tender offer plan); Dwight W. Stone II et al., Dealing with the Inevitable: Practical 
Considerations in Defending Merger Objection Lawsuits, FOR DEFENSE, Oct. 2013, at 56, 
http://www.wtplaw.com/sites/default/files/document_pdf/DRI%20-%20Dealing%20with%
20the%20Inevitable%20-%20October%202013.pdf (class-action law firm press releases 
announcing litigation often follow within hours of merger announcements); see also In re Philip 
Morris Sec. Litig., 872 F. Supp. 97, 98–99 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (shareholders filed suit five hours 
after announcement that Phillip Morris would lower cigarette prices), aff’d in part sub nom., 
San Leandro Emergency Med. Grp. Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75 F.3d 801 (2d 
Cir. 1996). 
 84.  Trulia, 129 A.3d at 892 (noting lawyer’s complaints are “hastily drafted”). 
 85. Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at 38, Assad v. World 
Energy Sols., Inc., C.A. No. 10324-CB (Del. Ch. Aug. 20, 2015) (statement of C. Bouchard) 
(“It just can’t be that there are meaningful disclosure violations in every single M&A case that’s 
being filed in this court. And I think there’s a lot of concern that a lot of the stuff that has been 
occurring historically is very fluffy.”). 
 86. See CORNERSTONE 2016, supra note 66, at 4 (noting that by 2014, nearly 80% of 
merger litigation settled before deal closing, but that since then, that rate has dropped to 56%, 
potentially as a result of Trulia); Jackson & Roe, supra note 2, at 208; Markel & Burns, supra 
note 75, at 2–3. 
 87. O’Connell et al., supra note 64; see also Britt K. Latham & James P. Smith III, The 
Future of Disclosure-Only Settlements, N.Y.L.J. (May 23, 2016), https://www.law.com/new
yorklawjournal/almID/1202758057785/the-future-of-disclosureonly-settlements (acknowl-
edging the prevalence of the term “deal tax,” suggesting also a more charitable label: 
“deal  insurance”). 
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securities law, has become increasingly prevalent under state 
corporate law. 
IV. TRULIA: THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY RESHAPES THE 
CLASS-ACTION SETTLEMENT APPROVAL LANDSCAPE 
For years, judges in Delaware acknowledged the merger litigation 
problem but routinely approved disclosure-only settlements, often 
begrudgingly.88 In recent cases to come before the Court of Chancery, 
the judges indicated that their patience was running thin and that a 
solution to end abusive disclosure-only settlements was needed.89 The 
solution finally came in Trulia when Chancellor Bouchard refused to 
approve the settlement proposed by the parties, adopting a new 
“plainly material” standard, and ushering a new paradigm into the 
merger objection litigation regime. This new standard ought to be 
incorporated into all jurisprudence dealing with issues rooted in the 
federal securities laws. 
The facts of Trulia were, by 2016 when the case found its way to 
the Court of Chancery, fairly garden variety. This is only to say that 
Trulia was not a response to a novel or unique problem. Instead, it 
was the straw that broke the Court of Chancery’s back. The facts 
being more or less generic, a cursory treatment should suffice to 
convey the importance of the court’s ruling.  
In brief, in 2015, two real estate data firms, Trulia, Inc., and 
Zillow, Inc., agreed to an all-stock merger wherein Zillow would 
acquire Trulia.90 As is required by the Delaware General Corporate 
Law (DGCL),91 and typical under the corporate law of most U.S. 
jurisdictions,92 this type of merger must be approved by shareholder 
vote. In anticipation of a proxy vote to approve the deal, the merger 
 
 88. In re Sauer-Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1141 (approving a fee award, but a significantly 
reduced one, noting that the “case [did] not merit a significant award”); Trulia, 129 A.3d at 
894 (noting the Court’s criticism of fee requests from settlements based on disclosures of 
“marginal value”). 
 89. See Trulia, 129 A.3d at 892. 
 90. Id. at 886. 
 91. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)–(c) (2016). 
 92. See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
407, 418–19 (2006) (speaking of shareholder rights generally, Velasco categorizes the right to 
approve a merger as “fundamental” in many jurisdictions); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
11.04(b) (2016). 
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was publicly announced,93 and accompanying public disclosures were 
made with the SEC as required of public companies under the federal 
securities laws.94 Almost immediately, four shareholders separately 
instigated class-action lawsuits against Trulia’s directors, claiming that 
certain aspects of the merger were unfair and that the board’s approval 
was a breach of fiduciary duty.95 Trulia quickly moved to settle the 
claims. The Court of Chancery responded by issuing a decision 
addressing the parties’ request for approval of the terms of their 
proposed settlement.96 
The shareholders in Trulia brought a variety of claims against the 
directors. After the four outstanding class-action suits were 
consolidated, four claims leveled at the Trulia board remained: (1) that 
the board did not get the best price possible; (2) that the company 
was improperly valued; (3) that agreeing to a no-shop provision was 
detrimental to the company; and (4) that the board “disseminat[ed] 
materially false and misleading disclosures to the Company’s 
stockholders.”97 Of these claims, the fourth was clearly the most 
important to the plaintiffs because it was the only claim supported in 
the plaintiffs’ briefing or discussed in any detail in Chancellor 
Bouchard’s opinion.98 It is also important to note that the first three 
claims (which were largely ignored) were questions of pure corporate 
law, while the fourth claim (on which the entire decision rested) was 
a question of pure federal securities law.  
Shortly after the claims were filed, Trulia produced a 
memorandum of understanding agreeing to settle the claims by 
providing additional disclosures to its shareholders.99 In time, the 
company provided additional information in its proxy materials and in 
accordance with securities laws about, among other things, the role 
 
 93. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 886; see also Monique D. Hayes, When the Tides Turn: Fiduciary 
Duties of Directors and Officers of Distressed Companies, BUS. L. TODAY, July 2015, at 1 
(explaining the duty of loyalty and care owed to shareholders of a publicly traded company). 
 94. 17 C.F.R. § 230.165(a) (2017). 
 95. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 886–87. 
 96. Id. at 887. 
 97. Id. at 889. But see Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise, Settlement, and 
Release at 2–3, In re Trulia, 129 A.3d 884 (No. 10020-CB) (listing five original class-
action suits). 
 98. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 889. 
 99. Id. 
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that certain analysts played in the transaction process and the 
methodology that investment banks used in valuing the acquisition.100 
In exchange for these disclosures and a commitment from Trulia not 
to oppose a request for $375,000 in attorney’s fees, the plaintiffs 
agreed to the settlement and to release Trulia from all present and 
future claims.101 
Typically, a settlement between a plaintiff and a defendant ends 
litigation. The defendant offers payment to the plaintiff, who releases 
the defendant from liability regarding the underlying claims. 
Individual plaintiffs are usually free to broker any settlement they 
wish—courts do not typically intervene. However, in the class-action 
context, a settlement affects more than just the named plaintiffs 
because all members of the class are bound by the judgment.102 If 
individuals not immediately party to litigation will be bound and 
precluded in the future from bringing further claims, then it is 
important to safeguard against plaintiffs accepting settlements that 
may be adverse to other class members’ interests or rights.103 For this 
reason, a class-action settlement must be proposed to the court, and 
the judge must review the settlement to see that it is “fair, reasonable, 
and adequate,” and either approve or reject it.104 
In Trulia, Chancellor Bouchard reviewed the proposed 
settlement, found that it did not adequately protect the interests of 
the class members, and rejected it.105 The plaintiff ’s attorneys sought 
to justify the settlement on the premise that the three major 
stakeholders would be left in the following favorable positions: the 
shareholders would receive valuable additional disclosures, the 
corporation would receive the assurance that the deal would not be 
challenged further, and the plaintiffs’ attorneys would take home a fee. 
 
 100. Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise, Settlement, and Release, supra note 97, 
at 6. 
 101. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 889–90. 
 102. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (explaining that classes, by their nature, must include and bind 
all affected individuals to avoid inconsistency that would arise from individual litigation). 
 103. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 966–67 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(“[T]he Court attempts to protect the best interests of the corporation and its absent 
shareholders all of whom will be barred from future litigation on these claims if the settlement 
is approved.”). 
 104. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); see also DEL. CH. CT. R. 23(e). 
 105. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 907. 
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However, Chancellor Bouchard’s review found that the additional 
disclosures that the Trulia board provided were immaterial, and 
therefore, the settlement was based on consideration that had no 
value.106 The additional information Trulia offered was obviously 
massaged from the existing disclosures, if not downright trivial. In any 
event, none of the information submitted could have been expected 
to affect a stockholder’s decision to approve the merger.107 With the 
disclosures deemed “immaterial,”108 they could not serve as 
consideration for the release of claims the stockholder class would give 
in exchange.109 With no approved settlement, the court had no basis 
on which to approve attorney’s fees.110  
In rejecting the parties’ settlement proposal, Chancellor Bouchard 
adopted a “plainly material” standard that the court will apply to all 
disclosures offered as consideration for a release of claims in merger 
objection litigation.111 This effectively brought disclosure assessment 
under Delaware corporate law in line with disclosure assessment under 
the federal securities laws as amended by the PSLRA.112 Since 
Delaware plaintiffs’ “hastily drafted complaints” seeking throw-away 
disclosures will now be subject to greater scrutiny than before,113 the 
practice of collecting six-figure attorney’s fee awards114 for relatively 
little effort has suddenly become much less of a certainty for plaintiffs’ 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 904–05 (explaining that one additional disclosure merely added “additional 
minutiae underlying some of the assumptions” in the original disclosures, while another was just 
a “triviality [that] could not reasonably be expected to affect the total mix of information”). 
 108. Id. at 905 (quoting In re MONY Grp. Inc. S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 28 (Del. 
Ch. 2004)). 
 109. Id. at 907. 
 110. See generally id. 
 111. Id. at 898. 
 112. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A) (2012) (class actions cannot prevail unless disclosed 
information was materially false). 
 113. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 892. 
 114. See ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2012 M&A 
LITIGATION 9 (Feb. 2013 Update) [hereinafter CORNERSTONE 2012] (average fee requested in 
2012 was $540,000); Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys’ Fee Awards: The Delaware Court 
of Chancery’s Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only Settlements, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 669, 703–04 (2013) (Sumpter conducted an empirical study that grouped fee awards into 
three bands, with the majority of Delaware settlements approved awarding fees in the $300,000 
to $500,000 award band, while Vice Chancellor Laster repeatedly argued that the $400,000 to 
$500,000 award band is the appropriate starting-off point). 
4.Lewis.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018 4:04 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
736 
lawyers.115 In raising the standard and making settlements and quick 
fee payouts more difficult to secure, the Trulia decision should (and 
recent data suggests that it already has) serve as a deterrent to 
overenforcement of Delaware corporate law.116 Zealous plaintiffs’ 
lawyers will be less likely to challenge deals in Delaware court, and this 
has the potential to free up hundreds of millions of dollars in corporate 
resources, which ultimately benefits stockholders.117 
Considering the scope of abusive disclosure-only settlement 
litigation, the Trulia standard has the potential to reduce vexatious 
corporate litigation, which is itself an extension of federal securities 
litigation. Trulia offers a ready tool for state court judges to apply in 
corporate litigation. Nevertheless, because of the strong nexus to the 
federal securities laws, federal judges should also look to Trulia’s 
materiality standard when considering inadequate securities 
disclosure claims. 
V. TRULIA’S RELEVANCE TO THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 
A. At Its Heart, Trulia Is a Federal Securities Law Decision 
Even though Trulia is a state corporate law decision, it can and 
should be applied by federal judges hearing federal securities law 
claims. Trulia is relevant because it rests entirely on questions that are 
endemic to federal securities laws governing public disclosures. 
As noted earlier, the plaintiffs in Trulia brought four separate 
claims.118 The first three claims arose under Delaware corporate law, 
while the fourth claim alleging deficient public disclosures with the 
SEC was a question squarely rooted in the federal securities laws. The 
 
 115. See CORNERSTONE 2016, supra note 66, at 2. Merger litigation fell to only 64% of 
announced deals in the first half of 2016, down from 84% in 2015, id., and 93% in 2012. 
CORNERSTONE 2012, supra note 114, at 1. 
 116. See CORNERSTONE 2016, supra note 66, at 1 (noting the reduction of merger 
litigation in the first half of 2016 and attributing this to Trulia). 
 117. Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the 
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10B-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 
1313 (2008) (describing the equal application both in the context of 10b-5 securities class 
actions and merger objection class actions, of the concept of “pocket shifting”–the idea that the 
members of a class-action suit are likely to be shareholders, thus a judgment against the 
corporation actually hurts them). 
 118. Id. at 888–89. 
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only response to these four claims by the defendant was to issue 
additional disclosures; however, the information in the additional 
disclosures did not resolve the first three corporate law claims.119 Even 
though the plaintiffs never amended their pleading to withdraw these 
three claims, the proposed settlement referenced only the additional 
disclosures and attorney’s fees.120 Chancellor Bouchard did not even 
directly address the other claims sounding in corporate law. In other 
words, corporate law claims, germane to Delaware law and properly 
at home in the Court of Chancery, were ignored, while claims based 
in securities law and most appropriately heard in federal court, 
dominate the decision. This supports the idea that disclosure-only 
merger litigation is actually federal securities litigation dressed in 
disguise to allow it to escape federal jurisdiction. 
This practice has become commonplace. Sometimes the judge 
hearing the case glosses over the perfunctory corporate law claims; 
other times, the plaintiffs themselves move quickly past these claims 
towards a disclosure-based settlement.121 In Trulia, Chancellor 
Bouchard did not afford any attention to the plaintiffs’ three corporate 
law claims, instead focusing his decision entirely on the inadequate 
disclosure claim, a claim at home under the federal securities laws.122 
Why might Chancellor Bouchard ignore the other three 
outstanding claims? One possible explanation is that he knew that 
these claims were essentially throwaways and that raising such claims, 
only to later withdraw all but a deficient disclosure claim, was common 
practice in the Court of Chancery.123 It could be that the practice of 
 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. at 889–90. 
 121. See In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1119–20 (Del. Ch. 
2011). In In re Sauer-Danfoss, the original claims included inadequate price and breach of 
fiduciary duty by Danfoss for announcing intention to proceed with a tender offer, and by Sauer-
Danfoss for responding to the proposed tender offer. Id. After filing the suit, no attempt was 
made for relief on these claims; rather, the parties went straight to disclosure-only settlement 
talks. Id.; see also In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6574-CS, 2013 
WL 1191738, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013) (“[A] suit without any real investigation or depth 
was immediately traded away by the plaintiffs for simply more information which did not 
contradict the mix of information that was already available.”). 
 122. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 899–907 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 123. Id. at 892 (Bouchard, C.) (explaining that there are “regular players . . . routinely 
filing hastily drafted complaints . . . on the heels of the public announcement of a deal and 
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loading a complaint with meritless claims, only to later withdraw all 
but the inadequate disclosure claim, had grown commonplace and 
perfunctory, and the Chancellor simply did not bother to comment 
on the oversight. Whatever the reason, the Chancellor’s neglect even 
to engage the questions of corporate law and his focus only on the 
question of the inadequacy of federal securities disclosures shows that 
the decision in Trulia is ripe for application by federal judges hearing 
securities law claims. 
B. Exporting Trulia: A Precedent to Shore Up Private Enforcement in 
Securities Litigation 
Trulia is shaping up to be a watershed decision in public merger 
litigation. Because Delaware “dominates the market for 
incorporations of publicly traded firms”124 and is renowned for its 
expertise in corporate matters,125 the law and policy that the Court of 
Chancery develops has a disproportionately large influence on 
corporate law nationwide.126 In fact, Chancellor Bouchard’s 
declaration in Trulia that disclosure-only settlements would be 
rejected unless the disclosures offered material information to 
stockholders127 has since taken firm root in several other jurisdictions. 
Within months of the ruling, four more Court of Chancery 
decisions followed Chancellor Bouchard’s holding in Trulia,128 and 
four non-Delaware state court decisions had applied it or cited it 
 
settling quickly on terms that yield no monetary compensation to the stockholders 
they represent”). 
 124. Sara Lewis, Transforming the “Anywhere but Chancery” Problem into the “Nowhere but 
Chancery” Solution, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199, 200 (2008). 
 125. John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1381 (2012) 
(explaining that Delaware courts are the “standard-setter for corporate law”). 
 126. See In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(Posner, J.) (encouraging federal judges to adopt policy developed in the Court of Chancery 
because of that forum’s familiarity with “large transactions by public companies”); Latham & 
Smith III, supra note 87. 
 127. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898–99. 
 128. See In re Merge Healthcare Inc., Stockholders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 11388-VCG, 
2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 17, at *27–28 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2017); Nguyen v. Barrett, C.A. No. 
11511-VCG, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 147, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2016); In re Xoom Corp. 
Stockholder Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 11263-VCG, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *9 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 4, 2016); La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Black, C.A. No. 9410-VCN, 2016 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 36, at *19–20 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 2016). 
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favorably.129 Perhaps most importantly, Judge Richard Posner, writing 
for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
followed Trulia in In re Walgreen.130 Posner prefaces his application 
of Trulia by saying that “Delaware’s Court of Chancery sees many 
more cases involving large transactions by public companies than the 
federal courts of [the Seventh] [C]ircuit do, and so we should heed” 
Chancellor Bouchard’s decision.131 He then adopted, and quoted at 
length, Chancellor Bouchard’s “plainly material” standard for 
supplemental disclosure settlements.132 Even prior to Trulia, other 
courts had begun to push back on meritless disclosure-
only settlements.133  
While the increasing adoption of the Trulia’s “plainly material” 
standard in state and federal court is encouraging, it is not universal. 
In New York, for example, the courts have moved away from a 
materiality standard. In 2014, the New York Supreme Court, hearing 
Gordon v. Verizon Communications, analyzed whether a disclosure-
only settlement offered shareholders any “material value.”134 This 
standard foreshadowed Trulia. But then in 2017, the Supreme Court 
Appellate Division for the First Department in New York reversed the 
decision in Gordon, applying instead a “some benefit” standard.135 
Gordon seems to stand for the clear rejection of Trulia’s “plainly 
 
 129. See In re Am. Capital, Ltd. S’holder Litig., No. 422589-V, 2016 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 
6, at *31 n.51 (Cir. Ct. Md. Oct. 6, 2016); Corwin v. British Am. Tobacco PLC, No. 14 CVS 
8130, 2016 NCBC LEXIS 14, at *11–12 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2016); Strougo v. N. State 
Bancorp, No. 15 CVS 14696, 2016 NCBC LEXIS 13, at *3 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2016); 
Raul v. Burke, No. 15 CVS 16703, 2016 WL 382833, at *1 n.2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2016). 
 130. In re Walgreen, 832 F.3d at 725. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See City Trading Fund v. Nye, No. 651668/2014, 2015 WL 93894, at *13 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Jan. 7, 2015) (quoting In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 509 (Del. Ch. 
2010)) (“None of the supplemental disclosures ‘significantly altered the total mix’ of 
information made available.”), rev’d, 43 N.Y.S.3d 21 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); Gordon v. Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 653084/13, 2014 WL 7250212, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2014) 
(stating additional disclosures “add[ed] nothing of material value”), rev’d, 46 N.Y.S.3d 557 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
 134. Gordon, 2014 WL 7250212, at *3. 
 135. Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 46 N.Y.S.3d 557, 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017), 
rev’g Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 653084/13, 2014 WL 7250212, at *3 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2014). 
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material” standard.136 As one commentary describes, since Trulia, 
“actions are being filed in one (or more) states other than Delaware 
or in federal courts . . . courts in a variety of jurisdictions with less 
experience than the Court of Chancery are adjudicating these cases, 
which may result in less consistency in connection with the settlement 
of these actions.”137  
The clarity of Chancellor Bouchard’s standard for settlement 
approval in Trulia and the influence of Delaware decisions in 
corporate law nationally have the potential to make positive inroads 
towards curbing abusive public merger litigation.138 In fact, recent data 
suggests that Trulia has kicked off a shift in merger litigation trends. 
A 2016 study from Cornerstone Research analyzing trends in merger 
litigation documented “substantial” declines in merger objection 
litigation following Trulia.139 The authors of the report suggested that 
Trulia may be to blame (or perhaps more accurately to thank) for 
this.140 However, in its 2017 report, Cornerstone reported new data 
showing that merger litigation in federal courts had increased in the 
first half of 2017 to the highest level since 2009.141 It is possible that 
the initial decline in merger litigation reported in 2016 was simply a 
lull as plaintiff ’s lawyers redrew their litigation strategy. In any event, 
it seems clear that Trulia “caused plaintiffs to shift merger objection 
litigation to federal court.”142 What recent data around the uptick in 
merger litigation in federal courts, and what New York’s unfortunate 
decision to adopt a litigation-baiting “some benefit” standard make 
 
 136. Michael Maimone & Joseph Schoell, Chancery Should Reconsider Its Decision in 
Trulia, LAW 360 (May 9, 2017, 10:34 AM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/921686
/chancery-should-reconsider-its-decision-in-trulia. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 723 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(“Trulia adopted a clearer standard for the approval of such settlements.”). 
 139. CORNERSTONE 2016, supra note 66, at 2 (“The rate of M&A litigation has declined 
substantially since the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in Trulia.”). 
 140. Id. at 1 (“The lower rate [of merger litigation] in late 2015 and the first half of 2016 
may be due to the impact of the January 2016 Trulia ruling that diminished the acceptability of 
disclosure-only settlements.”). 
 141. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2017 MIDYEAR 
ASSESSMENT 1 (2017). 
 142. Id. 
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clear is the need for state and federal judges to join Judge Posner in 
uniformly adopting Trulia’s “plainly material” standard.  
Empirical evidence suggests that Delaware’s approach works to 
dissuade abusive litigation. Beginning in 2015, when Delaware judges 
started refusing to approve disclosure-only settlements, and 
culminating with Trulia in early 2016, the rate of merger litigation in 
Delaware declined significantly.143 The resurgence of merger litigation 
in federal court since then suggests that the plaintiff ’s bar now has a 
bleaker outlook on the prospects of success in Delaware and is seeking 
softer targets. A judicial standard of plain materiality, hatched in 
Delaware state court and applied across the country in state and 
federal court, has the potential to apply downward pressure to all 
disclosure-based merger litigation, regardless of forum. However, in 
order to avoid forum arbitrage and the inevitable race to the bottom 
that disparate standards encourage, the standard must be universal. A 
united stand against meritless disclosure settlements has the potential 
to reduce abusive merger litigation and restore efficiency to the system 
of private enforcement of securities-based law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Any analysis of the effectiveness of private enforcement of the 
federal securities laws is incomplete without also taking into 
consideration the spillover of securities litigation into state courts 
under the guise of corporate law claims beginning in the 1990s. 
For years, private litigation enforcing federal securities laws has 
been plagued by abuse. Congress’s legislative fixes in the mid-1990s 
and 2000s ended up pushing the problem into state courts under the 
guise of corporate fiduciary claims. The heart of the problem, 
however, remained unchanged: the ease of bringing class-action 
lawsuits built on information readily available in federal securities 
filings, and the relative certainty of a corporate defendant anxious to 
settle. Chancellor Bouchard changed this dynamic. He introduced a 
“plainly material” standard to the disclosure-only settlement approval 
process. The direct result is that parties to disclosure-based merger 
litigation can no longer settle meritless claims simply by producing 
 
 143. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Why the Surge in Merger Litigation Fizzled, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEAL BOOK, Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/23/business/dealbook
/why-the-surge-in-merger-litigation-fizzled.html. 
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unhelpful additional disclosures and paying attorneys’ fees. This tactic, 
long used by plaintiffs’ lawyers because of its quick and relatively low-
effort route to a substantial paycheck, seems to have lost these most 
appealing characteristics. The indirect result of Chancellor Bouchard’s 
decision has been an immediate and continued decline in merger 
litigation in Delaware. If this new standard is indeed responsible for 
scaring off meritless claims in Delaware, and the evidence suggests that 
it is, then this speaks well for private litigation as a tool for efficiently 
enforcing the federal securities laws. What remains to be seen is how 
the rest of the country will respond. As plaintiff ’s lawyers seek out new 
fora for these merger strike suits, it will be up to state and federal 
judges to adopt and apply Trulia’s “plainly material” standard. 
Already, Trulia is being considered in judicial decisions outside of 
Delaware, in most cases with eager acceptance, but in others with 
skepticism. A uniform application of the Trulia standard is needed. A 
unified application of the “plainly material” standard in class-action 
settlement review will reduce abusive securities-based litigation. The 
result will be increased efficiency of private litigation as an 
enforcement mechanism for claims based in the federal securities laws.  
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